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Abstract 
Although we primarily associate the term 'revolution' with radical, rupturing 
change, it also carries an older sense of coming full circle; marking the return to, 
or restoration of, an original position.  This second, restorative, connotation is the 
focus of this paper.  Unlike the scientific revolutions that were the focus of Kuhn's 
work, legal revolutions frequently claim to be restoring rather than rupturing the 
law's connection with its past, and recovering lost paradigms rather than inventing 
new paradigms.  Is such a restoration possible?  Can lost paradigms be regained, 
and put to work in a radically altered context?  Drawing on Kuhn’s account of 
paradigms as problem-solving frameworks, this paper argues that they cannot, and 
that attempts to do so run the risk of providing inadequate and incomplete 
responses to the questions and dimensions of interaction on which they are brought 
to bear. Addressing this requires a shift of emphasis in obligations theory, putting 
concepts back in the historical context in which they arose, paying closer attention 
to the approaches they replaced, and to what, if anything, was lost in the revolution. 
 
I. Introduction: The revolutionary turn in private law 
For much of its history, private law theory was incremental and conservative, 
particularly when it came to the fundamental categories and principles on which its 
intellectual apparatus was built. Even after the emergence of tort and contract from 
out of the detritus of the forms of action, early treatises were so firm in their 
adherence to established categories and classes, and so averse to attempts to detect 
broader general principles in the law, that Sir Frederick Pollock would later 
condemn them for seeing ‘nothing but shreds and patches’ in the law.1  
                                                        
* I am grateful to Christine Beuermann, Joshua Getzler, Steve Hedley, Caitlin O’Neil, Andrew 
Robertson, Geoffrey Samuel, Jenny Steele, Ilke Turkmendag, and participants at the Obligations 
VIII Conference for their comments on this chapter. 
† Newcastle Law School, Newcastle University, United Kingdom.  Email: t.t.arvind@ncl.ac.uk 
1 F Pollock, ‘The Province of the Law of Tort. By Percy H. Winfield’ (1931) 57 LQR 588, 589. 
Pollock was referring to the work of Charles Addison, a Victorian jurist who had published a treatise 
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This is no longer true. The half-century since the publication of the first edition of 
The Law of Restitution has seen a new, revolutionary turn in private law theory, in 
which theorists increasingly question fundamental aspects of the way in which 
private law is organised. The Law of Restitution not only created a new taxon, but 
also sought to reclassify into that taxon significant portions of the law that had 
historically been seen as belonging to other areas. This revolutionary tendency has 
been taken up not only by the restitution-oriented and restitution-inspired 
scholarship associated with the school of Peter Birks, but also the corrective justice 
school and a broad range of private law scholars — seen, not least, in the fact that 
two of the past three Obligations conferences have borne the titles of ‘Challenging 
Orthodoxy’2 and ‘Revolutions in Private Law’. 
Far fewer people now remember another, very different, development that took 
place only three years after the publication of The Law of Restitution, and which 
was no less significant than the appearance of that treatise. In 1969, the Society of 
Public Teachers of Law, as it then was, held a joint seminar with the Law 
Commissions of England and Scotland on the subject of the division and 
classification of law.3 The theme that emerged from the seminar was the precise 
opposite of the approach to legal classification taken by Goff and Jones. Rather 
than seeking to revive older and timeless concepts, the participants in the seminar 
pointed to the inadequacy of traditional ways of classifying the law even for the 
purpose of deciding cases: 
the value of the existing divisions and headings lies principally in the fact that they 
are more or less well understood; they should not be treated as possessing some 
kind of fundamental significance which can give to them a controlling role when 
it comes to the decision of individual cases. In other words, even if the law itself 
can be classified in accordance with the accepted terminology, care must be 
exercised to avoid the classification of concrete cases in such a way that their 
solution in terms of law appears to be dictated by their classification.4 
What was needed was a radical move towards a more fact-based system of 
classification.5 Such an approach, it was thought: 
                                                        
on contract in 1847, and one on tort in 1860. See CG Addison, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts 
and Rights and Liabilities Ex Contractu (London, W Benning, 1847) and CG Addison, Wrongs and 
their Remedies, being a treatise on the law of torts (London, Stevens and Sons, 1860). Pollock’s 
comment was directed at Addison’s treatise on tort, but he described the book on contract as being 
even worse — see Pollock, above n 1, 589. 
2 See S Pitel, J Neyers & E Chamberlain (eds), Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2013). 
3 The papers from the seminar were published in JA Jolowicz (ed), The Division and Classification 
of the Law (London, Butterworths, 1970), which also explains the reason for the seminar and the 
goals it hoped to achieve.  
4 JA Jolowicz and PB Fairest, ‘Summary of discussion’ in Jolowicz, above n 3, 86. 
5 The case for a fact-based system was put by Professor Jolowicz in a paper circulated to the 
membership of the SPTL prior to the seminar, which was subsequently reprinted in the final volume. 
JA Jolowicz, ‘Fact Based Classification of Law’ in Jolowicz, above n 3. 
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would reveal anomalies and inequalities by bringing into juxtaposition concrete 
situations which are similar in their social or factual significance but are at present 
treated as falling under different branches of law and for that reason treated 
differently by the law.6 
In purely objective terms, this seminar was as path-breaking as the development of 
restitution theory. It left an intellectual legacy in its influence on the work of the 
Law Commission, and on legal scholarship more generally not least through its 
introduction of fact-based categories which continue to be influential.7 Many of the 
more radical categories it introduced, like labour law and consumer law,8 are now 
the subject of a broad academic consensus, unlike restitution whose scope and 
fundamental principles remain the subject of considerable controversy.     
It is, nevertheless, a peculiarity of the way the intellectual history of private law 
over the past half-century is told that this latter seminar plays no part in the story 
of key moments in the history of private law during the twentieth century. This 
chapter will argue that the reason for this peculiarity lies in a peculiar feature of 
legal revolutions. In the modern cultural imagination, the term ‘revolution’ is 
primarily associated with a sense of ‘overthrowing’ — with radical, rupturing 
change, where a connection to the past is broken, and older frameworks and 
systems are torn down to be replaced with newer, freshly-devised frameworks and 
systems. Yet the term ‘revolution’ also carries an older sense not of overthrow, but 
of return or recovery.9 To complete a revolution in a geometric sense is to come 
full circle; marking the return to, or restoration of, an imagined original position.  
This older sense of ‘revolution’ is familiar in legal history. The English 
revolutionaries of the seventeenth century did not seek to destroy the existing order 
as much as they sought to restore the ‘Ancient Constitution’ — an older, more 
perfect, and more natural order which had come to be corrupted due to human 
action and human innovation over the course of history.10 In recent private law 
revolutions, too, it is this older sense of revolution that has dominated. Unlike 
scientific revolutions, such as those studied by Thomas Kuhn,11 legal revolutions 
expressly seek to restore rather than rupture the law's connection with its past. The 
goal they espouse is that of recovering lost paradigms rather than creating new 
paradigms. The attempts to remake private law which began in the 1980s, in 
particular, are characterised by a strong sense of looking back and seeking to 
                                                        
6 Jolowicz and Fairest, above n 4, 86–87. 
7 See, eg, S Hedley ‘Contract, tort and restitution: or on cutting the legal system down to size’ (1988) 
8 Legal Studies 137. 
8 At the time, a ‘labour lawyer’ would generally have been taken to be a lawyer who supported the 
Labour Party (as seen, for example, in the name of the Society of Labour Lawyers). 
9 See C Calhoun, The Roots of Radicalism: Tradition, the Public Sphere, and Early Nineteenth-
Century Social Movements (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2012) 76–77. 
10 JGA Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, reissued edn (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1987). 
11 T Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd edn (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1996). 
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recover older forms of thinking about private law which, it is claimed, are superior 
to those that characterise the present day. Their radicalism is the ‘radicalism of 
tradition’.12  
Birksian taxonomy, for example, expressly seeks to draw on the work of jurists of 
the late Roman Empire — in particular, Gaius and Ulpian, whose work is said to 
have such an enduring and immediate relevance that engagement with them can 
and will improve the quality of English law.13 Corrective justice, similarly, looks 
back to ideas articulated by Aristotle and Kant, which its proponents claim were 
once more central to English law than they now are, and which they seek to restore 
to that central position.14  It has even been claimed by commentators (but not by 
the protagonists themselves) that the American realists were reaching back beyond 
the intervening period of the ‘Formal Style’ to the earlier, pre-Civil War period of 
the ‘Grand Style’ in which courts were far less concerned with the dry words of 
rules and far more willing to adjust law in order to deal with the changing context, 
and better respond to social pressures and social needs.15 Across a diverse range of 
schools and scholars, putative revolutions in the law are now conceptualised in 
terms of their relation to older and better modes of thinking about law which have 
now been forgotten16 or from which we have fallen away,17 and which we must 
seek to restore.18 Such a restoration, so it is argued, is both possible and desirable.19  
It is this, then, that distinguishes the 1969 seminar from the publication of The Law 
of Restitution. While The Law of Restitution was grounded in concepts and 
categories taken from the past, the 1969 seminar by express choice was not. They 
thus instantiate two divergent models of the contribution academic jurists can make 
to legal adaptation: the first a revolutionary model focusing on using the past to 
construct a grand theory of relevance to the present, and the second a heuristic 
model which seeks to devise solutions rooted in contextual details of contemporary 
problems, and whose engagement with the past is diagnostic rather than 
prescriptive.  
                                                        
12 Calhoun, above n 9, 82–120. 
13 See, eg, P Birks, ‘Definition and Division: A Meditation on Institutes 3.13’, in P Birks (ed), The 
Classification of Obligations (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997). 
14 EJ Weinrib, Corrective Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012). 
15 G Gilmore, The Ages of American Law (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977) 12. 
16 See, eg, A Beever, Forgotten Justice: Forms of Justice in the History of Legal and Political 
Theory (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013). 
17 R Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). 
18 See, eg, A Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007). 
19 It is at least arguable that some of the work, in the immense value it attaches to the past, crosses 
the line into committing what, in historiographic terms, is commonly termed the fallacy of nostalgia. 
See J Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 3rd edn (London, Longman, 2002) 17–18. It should, of course, 
be noted that interpretivist legal scholars reject the relevance of historiography for legal engagement 
with history: the fact that their engagement with the past is historiographically problematic is, on 
this account, irrelevant to their enterprise. See generally A Beever and C Rickett, ‘Interpretive Legal 
Theory and the Academic Lawyer’ (2005) 68 MLR 320.  
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This chapter argues that the revolutionary model has failed. Restoration of lost 
paradigms is neither possible nor desirable. It is not possible because whilst it is 
possible for older approaches and modes of thought that have been ‘lost’ to be 
reconstructed, legal revolutions cannot truly turn the wheel around to return to 
older positions, nor can they be put to work in the radically altered context that the 
present necessarily is. Even were it possible, it would not be desirable because the 
consequences of articulating legal doctrine in a way that emphasises its timeless 
continuity, even as the context in which it operates changes, are fundamentally 
negative. Legal revolutions which seek to recover a lost past are counter-
productive, because far from leading to the establishment of a new paradigm, their 
tendency is to produce a phenomenon akin to incommensurability, a ‘scampering 
discourse’ as Richard Mullender has termed it,20 with different wings of legal 
theory so widely separated that they can no longer even be said to be studying the 
same phenomenon.  
The aim of this chapter is to offer a diagnosis of what it is about attempts to shape 
legal revolutions that leads to their having a propensity to produce deleterious 
effects. Part II sets the stage by demonstrating how revolutionary accounts of the 
law fall short of their own promises. Parts III and IV build on that argument to 
show, through a detailed engagement with Kuhn’s work on scientific revolutions 
and scientific paradigms, that attempted legal revolutions differ fundamentally 
from scientific revolutions (Part III), and that legal paradigms are characterised by 
features that have no counterpart in scientific paradigms (Part IV). Thus, whilst 
they seek to return to the past, they almost invariably fail to give adequate weight 
to important aspects of the past and, in consequence, embed dramatically different 
evaluative positions from those with which they claim continuity. Legal theory has 
spent too long seeking progress through revolutions. It is time to move to a more 
modest definition and understanding of the goals and capabilities of legal 
scholarship. 
II. The limits of legal revolutions 
Legal revolutionaries have been criticised by their opponents for the selectivity of 
their engagement with the past.21 Selective engagement with the past can lead to 
two types of errors. In the first instance, it can lead to a misunderstanding of how 
the law reached its present position, and of the choices made in that process. It can 
thus lead to a mistaken view of the historical inevitability of the law as it presently 
stands, and to inadequate attention being paid to alternatives that have in fact been 
present in the past of the law. Secondly, it can lead to false accounts of the law 
itself, by reading normative choices into it that it does not in fact make, while 
                                                        
20 R Mullender, ‘The Scampering Discourse of Negligence Law’ (2010) 7 The Journal 
Jurisprudence 575. 
21 This is a key theme in, for example, S Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law: Categories and 
Concepts in Anglo-American Legal Reasoning (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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failing to appreciate the normative choices implicit in the types of outcomes the 
law currently favours. 
This leaves legal revolutions prone to three different types of weaknesses. First, 
they tend to oversimplify the past, ignoring alternate ways of viewing the law or 
framing legal problems which existed in the past. Secondly, by interpreting the past 
in the light of the needs of the present, they also ignore the true character of the 
evaluative positions implicit in the past of the law, with the result that legal 
revolutions frequently end up embedding into legal doctrine positions which are 
radically different from those with which they claim continuity. Thirdly, they leave 
themselves prone to failures to perceive the normative shifts which characterised 
the transition from the past to the present, and which continue to influence the 
law.22 
A. (Mis)interpreting the past: A revolutionary problem 
Let us begin with the first and second of these weaknesses.  Both are instantiated 
by the restitutionary view of equity. The rejection of equity by the restitutionary 
revolution’s protagonists is grounded in a view of equity which sees equity as a 
historical accident having no objectively justifiable basis as a taxon.  What we call 
‘equity’ today contains a disparate set of actions united only by their roots in a now-
abolished jurisdiction. Modernising the law, they argue, requires replacing 
historical accidents with more logical categories. 
The restitutionary view of equity claims support from the traditional division of the 
equitable jurisdiction into the auxiliary, concurrent, and exclusive jurisdictions.  As 
the labels suggest, this division conceptualised equity in terms of the relationship 
between its jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of common law courts. Yet this 
division is a recent one.  Although familiar from nineteenth century writings, it first 
appeared only at the very close of the eighteenth century, and for the first decades 
of the nineteenth century it had to compete with older conceptions of equity which 
were wholly substantive, and which continued to command support as statements 
of equity’s jurisdiction.  
The oldest of these substantive accounts is a well-known couplet printed in Rolle’s 
Abridgment, and attributed there to Thomas More: 
 Three things are to be helpt in Conscience; 
 Fraud, Accident, and things of Confidence.23 
                                                        
22 A similar point has been made in relation to Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions by theorists 
who argue that the attention it focuses on science’s past deflects attention away from the modern 
social role of science and the normative choices implicit in assigning it that particular role. See, eg, 
S Fuller, Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times (Chicago, Chicago University 
Press, 2000). 
23 1 Roll Abr 374. 
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This continued to be the orthodox statement of the scope of equity jurisdiction, in 
various formulations, through the course of the eighteenth century. As late as 1815, 
an amended version was put forward by Henry Maddock: 
It will, however, be more convenient to consider the Equity Jurisdiction of the 
Chancellor (except what relates to the Practice, which will be treated of hereafter) 
under the following heads: 
1. Accident and Mistake. 
2. Account. 
3. Fraud. 
4. Infants. 
5. Specific Performance of Agreements. 
6. Trusts. 
According, even to this enlarged classification of the subject, it may not be very 
obvious how the great multiplicity of doctrines arising out of the Equity 
Jurisdiction, can be included; but on consulting the divisions and subdivisions of 
each head, it will be found, that, without any arbitrary classification, they include 
every branch of Equity.24 
Others, such as Lord Redesdale, put forward accounts which were remedial, in that 
they sought to describe the jurisdiction of equity with reference to the remedies it 
granted and the situations in which they were granted, rather than the jurisdiction 
in which those remedies were granted.25  
The first traceable account of equity jurisdiction which is recognisably 
jurisdictional is found in the editorial notes added by John Fonblanque26 to an 
anonymous treatise titled A Treatise of Equity, conventionally attributed to Henry 
Ballow.27 It thereafter appears to have spread rapidly as a way of understanding the 
basis of equity jurisdiction.  Fonblanque’s note is brief, going no further than 
naming and very briefly describing the auxiliary, concurrent, and exclusive 
jurisdictions. The reasoning behind the classification is not given. The American 
edition of the treatise, however, goes into greater detail. Maddock’s classification 
is acknowledged, but is expressly rejected in favour of the system proposed by 
Fonblanque. The rationale, as it appears in the text, is that ‘such a method seems to 
be dictated by the character of equity as an auxiliary system engrafted on the 
ordinary jurisprudence’.28 It was, in other words, expressly devised in order to help 
                                                        
24 H Maddock, A Treatise on the Principles and Practice of the High Court of Chancery (London, 
W Clarke, 1815). 
25 J Mitford, A Treatise on the Pleadings in Suits in the Court of Chancery by English Bill, 2nd edn 
(P Bryne, Dublin, 1795). 
26 J Fonblanque (ed), A Treatise of Equity (Dublin, P Bryne, 1793). 
27 The treatise was first attributed by Fonblanque to Henry Ballow in the second edition. In a 1792 
printing of the treatise (without Fonblanque’s notes) in Dublin, however, it was attributed on the 
title page to Sir Jeffrey Gilbert. Given Gilbert’s career as Chief Baron of the Irish Exchequer, the 
attribution merits consideration, although Macnair does not list it among Gilbert’s treatises. M 
Macnair, ‘Sir Jeffrey Gilbert and his Treatises’ (1994) 15 Journal of Legal History 252. 
28 A Laussat (ed), A Treatise of Equity, 3rd American edn (Philadelphia, John Grigg, 1831) 21–32. 
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lawyers meet a very practical problem, namely, the fact that a growing range of 
transactions could potentially have fallen within the jurisdiction of Chancery as 
well as King’s Bench, creating a need for some sort of system to map the 
relationship between the two.29  The jurisdictional account of equity, in other 
words, was not put forward as a full account of what equity was about or of its 
place within the overall legal system.  It simply reflected the need for a practical 
solution to a practical problem.   
In treating the jurisdictional account of equity as the account of equity (rather than 
as simply one of many accounts of equity), restitutionary scholarship displays a 
key weakness of legal revolutions — namely, their propensity to seize upon one 
moment in the past, or of one tendency within the past, and treat it as paradigmatic 
of the past, paying little attention to the fact that the past of the law also contains 
radically different ways of thinking about the law.  This problem is not confined to 
equity as a taxonomic category, but also applies to theorisation about the 
relationship of individual equitable actions to other branches of law.  As Andrew 
Robertson points out in his contribution to this volume, a study of how estoppel 
worked three hundred years ago produces a very different picture from a focus on 
how estoppel worked fifty years ago.30  
This also leads revolutionary theorists to a second weakness, namely, ignoring the 
true character of the evaluative positions embedded in the past of the law.  Once 
again, equity provides a very good example.  If we look at the substantive actions 
that were said to be within equity’s jurisdiction even as late as the nineteenth 
century, equity is seen to have dealt with aspects of transactions that have 
normative significance, but are inadequately addressed by its restitution 
replacement. Haynes’ Outlines of Equity,31 for example, on its face discusses equity 
in terms of the three types of jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, a closer reading reveals a 
clear theme uniting the actions governed by the exclusive jurisdiction. Within this 
heading, Haynes places four matters — trusts, administration, married women’s 
property, and mortgages, penalties, and forfeiture. It is striking that all four of these 
are primarily concerned with situations marked by the presence of Hohfeldian 
powers — that is, with situations where one person has the legal ability to alter the 
jural relations to which another is party.32 This continues to find an echo in modern 
equity jurisprudence, as Robertson discusses in relation to estoppel,33 but it has no 
equivalent in restitutionary theory. Yet powers and immunities are juristically 
                                                        
29 Fonblanque cites Redesdale’s treatise as the source on which he based his jurisdictional account 
of equity.  Redesdale’s treatise itself, however, takes a remedial approach (as discussed above).  It 
is quite significant that the only reference to auxiliary, concurrent, and exclusive jurisdictions in 
Redesdale occurs in a discussion of demurrers in relation to the jurisdiction of Chancery. Mitford, 
above n 25, 103ff. 
30 A Robertson, ‘Revolutions and Counterrevolutions in Equitable Estoppel’ this volume, ch 13. 
31 FO Haynes, Outlines of Equity (Cambridge, Macmillan, 1858). 
32 W Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Legal Reasoning’ (1913) 23 
Yale Law Journal 16. 
33 Robertson, above n 30. 
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different from claims and privileges, and there is good reason to question an 
approach that does not recognise this difference. 
Equity in its classical form was, in other words, distinguished not by a distinctive 
jurisprudence,34 but by its concern with a distinctive set of issues.  A close study of 
the types of matters that eighteenth and nineteenth century commentators treated 
as falling within equity suggests quite strongly that the jurisdictional conception of 
equity was contingent rather than inevitable, and that even after its acceptance 
equity had considerable internal coherence.  The failure of restitutionary accounts 
to take adequate notice of this, and their espousal of rules embedding very different 
evaluative positions, demonstrates a fundamental weakness of revolutionary 
movements within law — namely, that their acceptance or rejection of aspects of 
the law takes inadequate account of the actual work that those aspects do within 
the legal system, and hence run the risk of leaving important legal needs 
unaddressed.  
B. Normative choices and legal change 
The two weaknesses we have examined thus far relate to the tendency of 
revolutionary movements in law to overly simplify the complexity of the past, and 
to ignore alternate possibilities present in the past. A similar point can be made in 
relation to the manner in which they approach legal change. This is illustrated by a 
second area of law, namely, public authority liability. I have discussed the complex 
history of this area of law in the twentieth century elsewhere, and I do not propose 
to repeat its details here.35 Briefly put, however, the peculiar position of public 
authority liability in tort is a result of two specific motives, both traceable to Lord 
Diplock. The first was a desire to insulate the courts from sitting in judgment over 
policy decisions made by the executive, particularly in relation to the goals that a 
particular authority chose to prioritise and the means it adopted in their pursuit. The 
second was to ensure that private law did not in any way disturb the supervisory 
framework over executive action set up by public law. Thus a crucial feature of the 
decision in Home Office v Dorset Yacht,36 a case more commonly associated with 
the expansion of the tort of negligence rather than its retreat, was Lord Diplock’s 
protective approach to public authorities. An action of a public authority, he 
suggested, should only ever lead to liability in tort if it was in violation of both 
private law and public law standards. To violate the one without violating the other 
should lead to no liability.  
                                                        
34 M Lobban, ‘Preparing for Fusion: Reforming the Nineteenth-Century Court of Chancery (Part 
1)’ (2004) 22 Law and History Review 389; M Lobban, ‘Preparing for Fusion: Reforming the 
Nineteenth-Century Court of Chancery (Part 2)’ (2004) 22 Law and History Review 565. 
35 TT Arvind, ‘Restraining the State through tort? The Crown Proceedings Act in retrospect’ in TT 
Arvind and J Steele (eds), Tort Law and the Legislature: Common Law, Statute and the Dynamics 
of Legal Change (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012); TT Arvind and L Stirton, ‘The curious origins of 
judicial review’ (2017) 133 LQR 91. 
36 Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004. 
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Beneath the surface of the revolution in the tort of negligence, therefore, is an 
approach that is extraordinarily defensive of public authorities. This approach is 
present in core cases, and is a part of a fundamental structure of the doctrine.  To 
discuss public authority liability in terms of distributive and corrective justice, or 
principle and policy, or any of the other conceptual apparatuses put forward by 
theorists seeking to revolutionise private law, is misleading, because it draws our 
attention away not only from the genealogy of the evaluative positions that we 
currently see embedded in legal doctrine, but from the actual evaluative position 
embedded in doctrine as well as the types of outcomes which the law seeks to 
facilitate. 
Situations of this type are not exceptional. They characterise attempts to foment 
revolutions in law, and reflect deep-running flaws in the structure of legal 
revolutions. To see this, however, we must return to scientific revolutions and study 
how they lead to change, before examining how legal revolutions differ.  
III. Scientific Revolutions and Legal Revolutions 
A. A matter of light 
One of the more frequently cited examples of a scientific revolution is the story of 
the rise to dominance of the wave theory of light. The history as it is conventionally 
told is an arresting one. In 1818, an engineer by the name of Augustin Jean Fresnel 
submitted an essay to a competition that had been organised by the French 
Academy of Sciences. The topic of the competition was the diffraction of light, and 
Fresnel’s paper presented an account of diffraction that dramatically, and 
fundamentally, challenged conventional wisdom.37  
Diffraction was a theoretically problematic phenomenon. It was known to exist, 
but it was poorly accounted for. Since the publication of Newton’s Opticks, light 
had been seen as particulate — a stream of tiny particles called ‘corpuscles’ 
travelling in a straight line. Why, then, did this stream seem to bend when it 
encountered the edges of obstructions? Newton’s explanation was not consistent 
with the results of subsequent experiments. Theorists had come up with equations 
which could partially account for the bending by supposing that the corpuscles’ 
path was influenced by forces which emanated from the objects they encountered. 
But it was generally acknowledged that the observed patterns of diffraction bands 
were hard to explain on the basis of the corpuscular theory. 
                                                        
37 The story of Fresnel’s paper and its role in establishing the Wave theory has become part of 
scientific folklore, and has been told in a number of sources in a number of different versions. The 
definitive account, however, on which the version told in this chapter is based, is contained in JZ 
Buchwald, The Rise of the Wave Theory of Light: Optical Theory and Experiment in the Early 
Nineteenth Century (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1989), which is entirely based on the 
primary sources, including correspondence and minutes, and corrects a number of errors in the 
traditional accounts. 
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Newton was not, however, the first to formulate a theory of light. Around twenty-
five before Opticks, the Dutch scientist Christiaan Huygens had proposed that light 
consisted of waves. A wave theory of light could explain diffraction, but the 
Newtonian corpuscular theory had considerable (albeit not universal) hold in the 
scientific community.  
Fresnel’s paper proposed a solution based on the wave theory. The mathematics 
was ingenious, involving functions based on improper integrals which remain in 
use today as the ‘Fresnal integrals’. But it faced an uphill task. Newton’s theory 
was strongly defended by Pierre-Simon Laplace, the grand old man of French 
science. The five-member commission charged with awarding the prize included 
not only Laplace himself, but also Siméon Poisson and Jean-Baptiste Biot, both 
committed Laplaceans and supporters of the corpuscular theory of light. 
In the conventional telling of the story, what transpired next was an extraordinary 
series of events leading to a dramatic collapse of the accepted Newtonian paradigm. 
In the Commission’s deliberations, Poisson led the attack on Fresnel’s theory. 
Perusing the mathematics, he noticed an implication of the equations which had 
escaped Fresnel. The equations, he pointed out, made a most striking prediction. 
They suggested that if a disc or sphere were to be placed in the path of light 
emanating from a small hole, there should be a bright spot in the middle of the 
shadow cast by the disc. This, clearly, was absurd. But another member of the 
Commission, François Arago, was more sympathetically disposed to the wave 
theory, and he suggested that the Commission put the prediction to a test. The test 
revealed, to general surprise, that the prediction was correct — counter-intuitively, 
there was indeed a black spot in the centre of the shadow. The result, as Kuhn put 
it, was that ‘French resistance collapsed suddenly and relatively completely’. A 
scientific revolution had taken place, and a paradigm had shifted.38 
B. A legal parallel? 
There is more to the story of the wave theory light than the received telling allows, 
and we will return to it in section IV of this chapter. The conventional account, 
however, on its face presents a striking parallel to legal revolutions in at least three 
ways. By the time the first edition of The Law of Restitution was published, it had 
become apparent that the traditional account of the actions that were variously 
called ‘quasi-contract’ or ‘constructive contract’39 failed to explain why they 
existed and functioned as they did. As with diffraction, the core insight underlying 
the revolutionary paradigm was not new: the theoretical concept of restitution was 
known before The Law of Restitution, just as the idea that light could be a wave 
was known before Fresnel presented his theory. Also like diffraction, the main shift 
that separated the two was an ontological one, relating to the nature of light rays in 
                                                        
38 Kuhn, above n 11, 155. 
39 The term was used by analogy with constructive trust, constructive notice, constructive fraud, etc. 
See, eg, JC Knowlton, ‘Quasi Contractual Obligation of Municipal Corporations’ (1911) 9 
Michigan Law Review 671, 671. 
 12 
 
the case of Fresnel’s work and to the nature of certain common law actions and 
remedies in The Law of Restitution. Likewise, what gave Fresnel’s account its 
power was not the attractiveness of conceptualising light as waves rather than 
particles, nor was it merely the fact that the new theory had explanatory value. The 
key to its success lay in the fact that it also had predictive value. As its success in 
the face of Poisson’s challenge demonstrated, the conceptual framework it created 
was capable of dealing with issues and matters that had not been anticipated and, 
indeed, whose existence was not suspected when the theory was devised.40 In this, 
again, there is a parallel to the Law of Restitution, whose success sprang not as 
much because of the normative attractiveness of the scheme it used to explain the 
past cases, as because of the guidance it offered on their application. 
Despite these similarities, however, there are two important differences between 
scientific revolutions and the legal revolutions that private law theorists have 
attempted to foment over the past fifty years. The phenomena that are the subject 
of science are for the most part unchanging. Our ability to observe them and acquire 
accurate knowledge about them may change as we acquire better and more reliable 
instruments, but the phenomena themselves do not change. This is manifestly not 
true of law, where the social and jural relations that are its subject can and do 
change dramatically. Whether a society is feudal, capitalist, agrarian, industrial, or 
post-industrial makes no difference whatsoever to the interaction between atoms 
and the patterns of molecular reactions or atomic decay that are the subject of the 
natural sciences. They do, however, fundamentally alter the patterns of social 
interaction and the types of social conflict with which the legal system and the laws 
of the realm deal. In law, as in the social sciences generally, the problem with 
speaking of the cumulative growth of knowledge over time is that the thing known 
— society — keeps changing.41 Unlike the physical sciences, where the basic 
nature of atoms does not change, societies do.  
The consequence is of profound significance. The statements of natural science — 
scientific ‘laws’ — of their nature apply in contexts and settings that are far 
removed from those in which they were originally formulated. Legal rules, 
doctrines, and principles, in contrast, do not have universal application. Planck’s 
constant does not depend on social understandings of electromagnetic waves. The 
rules for the quantification of damages in personal injury cases, and even the broad 
approach that is taken to the quantification of such damages, do however depend 
on the social understandings and consequences of injury that characterise a polity. 
This difference is closely related to the second major divergence, namely, that in 
law, unlike in science, the act of describing a phenomenon alters the nature of the 
thing studied. In science, our articulation of a law does not change the subject of 
our study, merely its understanding. A new paradigm on the nature of black holes 
                                                        
40 On this, see J Worrall, ‘Fresnel, Poisson, and the white spot: The role of successful predictions 
in the acceptance of scientific theories’ in D Gooding, T Pinch, and S Schaffer (eds), The Uses of 
Experiment: Studies in the Natural Sciences (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
41 Cf the argument in G Samuel, ‘Is Legal Knowledge Cumulative?’ (2012) 32 Legal Studies 448. 
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does not change the nature of black holes, much as the effect of the acceptance of 
Fresnel’s theory did not lead to a change in the character of light rays. It only affects 
the scientific understanding of the phenomenon. This is not true of law, whose 
theories seek to alter the phenomena themselves. Indeed, the quest to do so is 
arguably the constitutive essence of legal revolutions. 
Given the thrust of these two differences, the third at first sight might seem 
somewhat paradoxical. It relates to the way in which legal revolutions and scientific 
revolutions engage with the past. A scientific revolution engages with paradigms 
of the past only to the extent they are part of the present. They do not seek to 
vindicate them, nor do they see them as having a timeless significance. Fresnel did 
not draw on the work of Huygens because he believed it to have a lasting authority, 
unlike the way in which the works of Ulpian, Kant, and Aristotle have been 
portrayed in modern legal revolutions.42 Unlike modern taxonomists, he did not 
believe that Huygens’ theory was a ‘software’ which all theories of light had to 
run.43 His paper was not an attempt to be faithful to Huygens, or even an 
exploration of the relevance of Huygens’ thought. It was an attempt to solve a 
contemporary problem, in which Huygens’ theory only played a role because it was 
part of the existing knowledge-base. His use of the work of Huygens was, in other 
words, purely heuristic.44  
This is typical of scientific thought and of the manner in which scientific paradigms 
are constructed. But it is not true of legal revolutions. There are certainly striking 
similarities between the heuristic guidance provided by the past in scientific 
progress, and the role played by the past in non-revolutionary legal change, the 
1969 seminar discussed in Section I of this chapter being a classic case in point. 
But revolutionary legal change is radically different. The restitution and corrective 
justice revolutionaries have not sought to use Ulpian, Kant, or Aristotle 
heuristically. Rather, they claim an authority for them that is not just enduring,45 
but also unavoidable,46 and they accordingly seek to apply these older frameworks 
to the modern context in a way that is faithful to the original conception.47 As the 
next section discusses in greater detail, it is this characteristic of legal revolutions 
                                                        
42 On the significance of the role of authority in legal scholarship, and its consequences for how we 
understand the enterprise in which legal scholars are engaged, see G Samuel, ‘Is law really a social 
science? A view from comparative law’ (2008) 67 CLJ 288. 
43 Peter Birks famously asserted that Gaius not only provided a software for legal thought, but that 
this was the best software available for the purpose of analysing the law of obligations in England 
in the twenty-first century: P Birks, ‘Introduction’ in P Birks (ed), English Private Law (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2000) xliv–xlvii. 
44 J Worrall, ‘“Revolution in permanence”: Popper on Theory-Change in Science’ in A O’Hear (ed), 
Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996) 92. 
45 See, eg, P Birks, ‘Roman Law in Twentieth-Century Britain’ in J Beatson & R Zimmermann 
(eds), Jurists Uprooted: German-speaking Émigré Lawyers in Twentieth-century Britain (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2004). 
46 See, eg, Peter Birks’ remarks on Gaius in Birks at above n 43. 
47 See, eg, EJ Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1995). 
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that makes them so prone to produce outcomes that are both unhelpful and 
deleterious to the integrity of the legal system. 
IV. Paradigms, theories, and black letter law 
A. Revolutions and paradigms 
The discussion thus far has focused on legal and scientific revolutions. 
Revolutions, in the Kuhnian sense, reflect changes or shifts in paradigms. Kuhn’s 
account was concerned with scientific paradigms. Legal reasoning and analytical 
frameworks are, however, conventionally described in terms of theories and 
doctrine, rather than paradigms. What, then, do we gain by importing the concept 
of paradigms from theories of revolutions in natural sciences into law? 
The answer lies in certain aspects of legal disagreement which are crucial to 
understanding the path of the law, and on which the idea of a legal paradigm puts 
particular focus. When we speak in terms of theories and doctrines, we place weight 
on two particular aspects of the frameworks we use in law: namely, the structured 
set of concepts they contain, and the rules that are brought to bear in associating 
particular sets of concepts with particular situations. If, however, we look more 
closely at the character of theoretical debates in private law, it becomes apparent 
that simply focusing on structured sets of concepts gives us an inadequate account 
of these debates. Speaking in terms of paradigms, rather than merely theories, in 
contrast makes what is at stake much clearer.  
What Kuhn meant by a ‘paradigm’ has been much misunderstood and, particularly 
in the social sciences, has come to be associated largely with the high-level 
conceptual frameworks and world-views that we associate with theory in the social 
sciences and humanities. But whilst paradigms do encompass these frameworks, 
they are not the crucial part of a paradigm. To Kuhn, the crucial part of a paradigm 
was not the framework, but the exemplars — the ‘paradigmatic’ instances of the 
application of a framework to a particular problem or (in the case of law) to a 
particular set of facts or a particular type of situation.   
Exemplars, in the form of the legal hypothetical, are endemic within law, ranging 
from the Roman problem of the barber who cuts the throat of a slave after having 
his hand jostled by a carelessly kicked ball, to Peter Birks’ tales of mistaken 
window washers.  It is these exemplars, and not the mere theories and laws, that 
are the constitutive essence of paradigms, a point which Kuhn lamented as the 
‘least understood aspect’ of his book.48 Secondary discussions of Kuhn’s account 
of how paradigms compete have tended to focus on his theory of 
incommensurability. But incommensurability is primarily Kuhn’s explanation for 
why paradigm shifts are both difficult and contested. It is not the essential 
characteristic of a paradigm. Paradigms represent consensus not about just theories 
                                                        
48 Kuhn, above n 11, 187. 
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and frameworks, but also problems and solutions which, firstly, instantiate the 
exemplary application of those theories and frameworks, and which, additionally, 
are accepted as being exemplars of good science generally. Theories and 
frameworks are not by themselves paradigms without also containing the 
application of the theories to the solution of important problems, and without 
having won broad-based acceptance for their assertion that those are exemplary in 
the literal sense: examples of how science can be done, of how it ought to be done, 
and of the power of the results we get when science is done as it ought to be done.49  
It is in this context that Kuhn, in discussing the emergence and passing of scientific 
paradigms, emphasises the problem-solving potentialities of paradigms. For a new 
paradigm to be accepted, it must promise to solve a problem that the existing 
paradigm cannot, and it must do so without sacrificing things that existing 
paradigms can solve, whilst also demonstrating that it is good science.50 Putative 
paradigms may win adherents, but they will not come to be accepted as paradigms 
until these criteria are satisfied through the exemplars the paradigm includes.   
Kuhn thus points to the close relationship within paradigms of epistemology and 
method, ontology, and evaluative judgments as to outcomes. This also holds true 
not just of the manner in which legal approaches — whether Birksian theory, 
corrective justice theory, or legal realism — make a case for acceptance, but more 
fundamentally of the nature of the controversies legal revolutions cause.  
Restitution, once again, provides a good example. The taxonomic approach to 
restitution has been criticised on the basis that the outcomes it produces are 
unattractive — for example, because they unacceptably widen liability51 — but the 
criticisms extend much further than just this. A more fundamental criticism has 
been that it is no way to do good scholarship — a criticism that almost inevitably 
attacks the precise things that Kuhn terms exemplars, the instances showcased by 
the theory. David Campbell, for example, drew an unfavourable comparison 
between the approach of Peter Birks and the approach taken by the American Legal 
Realists, making the point that the approach taken by Llewellyn instantiated good 
scholarship in a way the approach taken by Birks did not: 
However powerful Birks’s arguments, it is perfectly laughable to think that 
someone sitting in his study can produce a workable revision of the whole of the 
law of obligations. One has only to give a moment’s thought about how Llewellyn 
went about producing the Uniform Commercial Code to see what is needed to 
begin to get the job done properly.52 
                                                        
49 Kuhn, above n 11, 187–191. 
50 Kuhn, above n 11, 38–39. 
51 See, eg, S Hedley, Restitution: Its Division and Ordering (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2001) 
27–32. 
52 D Campbell, ‘Classification and the Crisis of the Common Law’ (1999) 26 Journal of Law and 
Society 369, 370. 
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Campbell levels a similar criticism at the corrective justice school, pointing out that 
their very definition of the problem is misconceived: 
There is no theoretical necessity to give up the great range of social philosophical 
and social scientific materials on which one could and should draw in order to 
accept the grossly empirical limitation of abstract doctrinal scholarship, especially 
when, after Calabresi and Macaulay, it should be obvious that the worst problem 
with the common law is not the bits it might wrongly include but the great areas it 
leaves out if one seeks an accurate account of what the law of obligations is 
outwith the library.53 
A review of the debate demonstrates that this is far from atypical. Criticisms of 
revolutionary theories in private law are focused at least as much on the model of 
legal scholarship implicit in those theories as they are on the details of the theories. 
Thus John Murphy’s critique of Torts and Rights was as directed at the particular 
approach to reductionism taken in that treatise as it was at the specific details of 
the theory it advanced.54 Stephen Waddams’ critique of a swathe of theories 
broadly associated with the corrective justice and taxonomic schools, similarly, 
points to the fundamental problems raised by theories which ignore the nuances of 
history and context and overly simplify the complexity of cases by forcing them 
into unidimensional categories such as ‘contract’ and ‘tort’.55  
Nor does this only run one way: critiques of relational theories of contracting have 
also tended to question the approach to scholarship which such a theory represents. 
Thus Gava and Greene criticise Hugh Collins’ theoretical approach to contract on 
the basis that it is methodologically impossible to apply: 
Collins’ problem is that he asks the impossible of judges. He expects them to apply 
law in a way that takes into account the intimate economic and social relationships 
between the parties and the economic and social context of transacting more 
generally, and also to be sensitive to the special problems arising from contracts 
with the government. All this as well as, of course, having an appropriate level of 
expertise in law. A superhuman made up of Oliver Williamson, Max Weber, 
Ronald Dworkin’s Hercules and Sir Humphrey Appleby might succeed at doing 
some of this, but even this superhuman would baulk at getting into the heads of 
disputing contracting parties! Judges are never going to be able to do what Collins 
asks of them.56 
Even more striking are theoretical works which ignore relational contract theory 
altogether on the basis that they cannot be called theories of contract law.57 This is 
precisely what Kuhn’s theory tells us to expect of paradigms, and of disagreements 
centred around competing paradigms — rather than merely around theories. This 
suggests that much like scientific paradigms, legal paradigms are also defined by a 
                                                        
53 Campbell, above n 52, 373. 
54 J Murphy, ‘Rights, Reductionism, and Tort Law’ (2008) 28 OJLS 393. 
55 Waddams, above n 21. 
56 J Gava and J Greene, ‘Do we need a hybrid law of contract? Why Hugh Collins is wrong and 
why it matters’ (2005) 63 CLJ 605, 620. 
57 S Smith, Contract Theory (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) 8. 
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particular approach to how we should ‘do law’, encompassing not just the 
conceptual apparatus we use to solve problems, but also the prior question of what 
constitutes law well done and the world view — or ‘thought style’ as Mary Douglas 
and other neo-Durkheimian institutional theorists would put it58 — that underlies 
that approach to solving problems.  
B. Theoretical revolutions and black-letter law 
A key feature of legal revolutions is therefore that they go to the question of the 
right way to do law. It is this that makes legal revolutions fundamentally 
unproductive, because their primary effect is to shape a growing gulf between the 
world of legal theory and the world of legal practice. In sharp contrast to the debate 
in legal theory about what constitutes ‘good’ or even ‘acceptable’ legal scholarship, 
legal discourse at the level of legal practice, or black-letter law, reflects the high 
level of consensus that Kuhn associates with paradigms. With the exception of a 
vanishingly small number of ‘critical’ textbooks,59 a typical contract textbook is a 
classically Kuhnian example of a paradigm, in that virtually every textbook reflects 
an extraordinarily high level of consensus and commonality in the way the subject 
is treated: the rules that are presented, the cases that are chosen, and even the 
hypotheticals that are used. The same set of leading cases feature in the majority of 
textbooks, and the doctrines for which they are taken to stand are described in very 
similar ways.  
Academic disagreements also do not influence the structure of legal textbooks 
within the law of obligations. Textbooks have remained largely unaffected by five 
decades of debate about taxonomy and the structure of the law, and do not depart 
from conventional paradigms of classification, principle, and articulation of rule. 
Indeed, for all the debate about the law of obligations, there are virtually no student-
level textbooks that treat the law of obligations as a single whole. 
This point is not trivial. To Kuhn, textbooks played a crucial role in defining 
paradigms.60 Paradigms, in his account, seek to capture the entirety of a 
phenomenon; and competition among scientific frameworks is judged with 
reference to their ability to account for and predict the broadest possible range of 
observed phenomena.61 Textbook accounts, by showcasing the method and 
worldview implicit in a paradigm, as well as the problem-solving ability of the 
paradigm, are a key means of projecting that paradigm’s ability to address a broad 
range of phenomena. It is precisely this that law textbooks do. Textbooks seek to 
draw students into legal ways of thinking (or ‘thinking like a lawyer’) in ways that 
are largely similar — for example, through a similar structure, or using similar 
                                                        
58 M Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1986). 
59 For example, R Halson, Contract Law, 2nd edn (Harlow, Pearson, 2012); L Mulcahy, Contract 
Law in Perspective, 5th edn (London, Routledge, 2008). The US equivalents are the textbooks 
prepared by Macaulay and Macneil. 
60 Kuhn, above n 11, 136–138. 
61 See especially the discussion of responses to crises in Kuhn, above n 11, 77–91. 
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types of hypotheticals.  This demonstrates that there is something in black letter or 
doctrinal law strongly akin to what Kuhn termed an accepted paradigm. Kuhn’s 
account of exemplars, in particular, closely parallels what HLA Hart called the 
‘core’,62 and it is the core that is the main concern of textbooks. The ‘penumbra’63 
naturally has less consensus, but in the textbook treatment these are represented as 
the unsolved problems that can in theory be solved using the paradigm, if one draws 
upon the standard exemplars as instances of outstanding legal reasoning. They are 
presented, at best, as problems that the paradigm has not yet solved, rather than as 
challenges to the paradigm itself. 
One reason for this consensus is that frameworks of practice are reductionist. As I 
have argued elsewhere, a significant portion of the work the legal system is called 
upon to do is dealing with the problems posed by conflicting expectations in 
society.64 One of the limitations of viewing the law in terms of doctrine is that the 
language of doctrine — dealing in concepts such as ‘reasonableness’, 
‘unconscionable’, ‘merchantable’ and so on — paints a picture of the law as rooted 
in consensus, and in the application of concepts whose meanings can be and 
typically are the subject of a uniform view. Yet in reality, private law is associated 
with situations of conflicting perspectives and conflicting expectations. The key 
‘law job’65 discharged by private law requires it to mediate in such conflicts — 
between, for example, the expectations of newspapers of the ability to print 
anything they believe to be in the public interest and the expectations of their 
victims to privacy;66 the expectations of secured lenders that their security merits 
protection versus the expectations of defrauded victims of financial scams; the 
expectations of scientific researchers in relation to unimpeded access to potentially 
useful material versus the expectations of indigenous people in relation to their 
traditional knowledge, to pick a few examples.  
Reductionism is an important aspect of the manner in which the law deals with 
conflicting expectations. This is inevitable: a social institution which sought to deal 
with conflicting expectations in their full complexity would find itself faced with 
the same underlying issues of value-incommensurability and divergent goals and 
understandings that produce conflicting expectations.67 The structured sets of 
concepts and rules created by legal theory are accordingly reductionist devices, 
which serve to reduce the complexity of the situations of conflicting expectations 
that it is the task of the law to resolve. They may do this directly, by guiding a 
                                                        
62 HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 
593. 
63 ibid. 
64 TT Arvind, ‘Obligations, governance and society: Bringing the state back in’ in A Robertson and 
M Tilbury (eds), The Common Law of Obligations: Divergence and Unity (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2016) 267–268. 
65 See K Llewellyn, ‘The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method’ 
(1940) 49 Yale Law Journal 1355. 
66 See most recently PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] AC 1081. 
67 Arvind, above n 64, 268. 
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decision-maker to take certain factors into account (for example, did a unilateral 
mistake as to identity relate to a face-to-face transaction or to a documentary 
transaction),68 but not to consider others (was the victim of a unilateral mistake 
particularly vulnerable to being influenced by a person purporting to be in a 
position of authority).69  
But more significantly, they may also do this indirectly, by creating conceptual 
structures whose effect is to strip out aspects of the situation that might influence 
us were they not stripped out. Duncan Sheehan and I have suggested that the 
primary mechanism through which they achieve this is by the creation of ideal 
types — non-empirical representations of phenomena which are purely mental 
constructs and which do not actually exist in their pure form.70 Many of the legal 
concepts used in private law, including core concepts such as ‘contract’, ‘consent’, 
‘reliance’, and ‘promise’, are ideal types, in that a completely specified category 
which took account of all the variations that characterise these concepts as 
empirical phenomena would be infinitely complex.71 Critically, however, any legal 
framework will at any time have within it different conceptual structures that could, 
potentially, be applied to any given set of facts, but whose application would 
simplify that set of facts in very different ways and produce very different 
outcomes. A central task of legal frameworks, therefore, is not only to set out sets 
of concepts and rules for their application, but also to provide a basis for 
discrimination, on which we can put a particular set of facts within one particular 
conceptual structure within that framework rather than another.72 
This has important implications. Because doctrinal frameworks are merely 
problem-solving tools which serve to reduce the complexity of fact situations, they 
are inherently incapable of being true or false. We can critique them on the basis 
that their evaluative approaches are undesirable, or that the reductionist framework 
they embed is undesirable, but because they are simply reductionist tools, they are 
never true or false. This makes it possible to adopt a heuristic approach in relation 
to doctrinal frameworks, where the focus is not as much on what is an exemplary 
way of doing law grounded in a sound worldview, as much as it is on the far simpler 
question of what is a useful way of doing law. Here, once again, the example of the 
wave theory in nineteenth century France provides a useful parallel.  
As Part III discussed, the conventional account says that the result of the tests 
carried out on Arago’s suggestion led to the immediate collapse of the corpuscular 
theory of light in France. The reality was somewhat more complex. As Buchwald 
                                                        
68 Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2003] UKHL 62, [2004] 1 AC 919. 
69 Cf the point made by Schauer in relation to the logic of formalism: F Schauer, ‘Formalism: Legal, 
Constitutional, Judicial’ in K Whittington, RD Kelemen, and GA Caldeira (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Law and Politics (New York, Oxford University Press, 2008). 
70 D Sheehan and TT Arvind, ‘Private law theory and taxonomy: Reframing the debate’ (2015) 35 
Legal Studies 480, 490–492. 
71 Sheehan and Arvind, above n 70, 491. 
72 On the importance of factual manipulation to the core functions of legal reasoning, see G Samuel, 
‘Is legal reasoning like medical reasoning?’ (2015) 32 Legal Studies 323. 
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has shown, although the result led Poisson to accept Fresnel’s mathematics and the 
laws of diffraction he had formulated, he continued to reject the theoretical 
foundation of those results. The results were valid in Poisson’s view, but the theory 
underlying the results was not. To Poisson, because a ray of light was something 
that could be observed, there must necessarily exist some physical objects 
corresponding to rays of light. The wave theory of light could only produce this 
result if the ‘disturbances’ that constituted the waves were through some process 
limited to a small, clearly-defined, linear geographical space. But the wave theory 
did not contain any basis for such a limitation. The solution proposed by the wave 
theory — that a ray was a mere mathematical construct, and that the real physical 
entity was not the ray but the wave front — was not something he accepted, because 
such a theory had no room for physical rays.73 As such, he believed that it suffered 
from a fundamental problem, and continued to hold that view until his death.74   
Yet, despite this fundamental ‘incommensurability’ between the corpuscular 
paradigm which Poisson held and the wave paradigm which Fresnel had put 
forward, Poisson had no difficulty in using the mathematical tools devised by 
Fresnel in his practical work. As Worrall has shown, this is because the framework 
within which science was conducted permitted him to use it as a heuristic — as a 
practical method that had demonstrated its ability to solve problems, even if aspects 
of it remained imperfect and potentially incorrect (in this case, the fact that the 
results were in Poisson’s difficult to account for on any known theory).75 The 
incommensurability of the underlying paradigms matter very little if the primary 
use of the framework in question is heuristic. 
The ability to engage with approaches as heuristics is fundamental to any 
community of practice, and it is this that underlies the surprising cohesiveness of 
doctrinal scholarship in the law of obligations. Consider, once again, the example 
of the 1969 seminar. Despite its ambition, and despite the seeming radicalism of 
the underlying aim of a fact-based classification of law ‘according to criteria which 
reflect the facts of social and economic life as they now exist’,76 the final 
publication is striking in terms of its caution. It expressly acknowledged: 
the impracticability of abandoning altogether the traditional or conventional 
divisions of the law because without an accepted terminology used more or less in 
accordance with existing usage communication of ideas about the law itself would 
become impossible. The law cannot be comprehended as a whole and broad 
divisions on well understood lines are essential.77 
                                                        
73 The nature of a light ray was not the only issue on which Fresnel and Poisson had fundamental 
conceptual differences. They also differed fundamentally in their respective conceptions of a 
number of other physical quantities, such as fluids. See I Grattan-Guinness, Convolutions in French 
Mathematics 1800–1840: From the Calculus and Mechanics to Mathematical Analysis and 
Mathematical Physics (Basel, Birkhauser Verlag, 1990) 909. 
74 Buchwald, above n 37, 188–194. 
75 Worrall, above n 40, 146–154. 
76 Jolowicz, above n 5, 7. 
77 Jolowicz and Fairest, above n 4, 86. 
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What it sought to achieve, instead, was a situation where the law could be discussed 
in terms of multiple, overlapping systems of classification, none of which were 
perfect, but which taken cumulatively would supplement each other, and point to 
situations where reliance on the traditional categories produced results that were 
unsatisfactory.78 
This willingness to countenance messiness, and to engage with different 
frameworks without worrying about the compatibility of their theoretical 
assumptions, is typical of a heuristic approach.79 This reflects the primacy they 
assign to practice.  Ideas in law, as in heuristic science, matter because they guide 
practice; and their correctness is judged by evaluating how successful they are 
when they are applied to practical life.80 In the context of the legal system, the aim 
is to assist the judge or other legal actor in creating reductionist models of the social 
phenomena that are the subjects of the law, and in attaching evaluative significance 
to different aspects of these phenomena. This makes the use of a heuristic both 
intelligible and justifiable.  
The difference with the position in legal theory is striking. The focus of doctrinal 
frameworks is on acceptable ways of reducing complexity, with the reasons why a 
particular approach is a good one taking a back seat. In revolutionary theories, in 
contrast, it is the reason that is the primary focus.81 The challenges to ‘good 
science’ are accordingly given pride of place in the debate, thus making the area of 
maximum incommensurability the primary focus of discussions. It is hardly 
surprising, then, that these discussions fail to produce anything resembling an 
accepted paradigm.  
Popper argued that the rationality of scientific revolutions lay in their ability to 
preserve the successes of their predecessors, unlike ideological revolutions which 
often consciously sought a break with tradition.82  The position in relation to 
heuristic, doctrinal change and theoretical revolutions in private law is precisely 
analogous. The world of legal theory, in consequence, is in what Kuhn termed a 
pre-scientific period, characterised by the existence of significant numbers of 
competing schools of thought which share so little common ground that there is 
                                                        
78 See especially the discussions of consumer law and labour law, and the limitations of contract as 
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Universitaires de France, 1994) 91–92. 
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little likelihood of progress to an accepted paradigm. The lack of any generally 
accepted exemplar of what constitutes ‘good’ theorisation is a particular sticking 
point. If the world of legal doctrine is the world of a community of practice, then 
the world of legal theory is a world of increasingly separated epistemic 
communities, with ever fewer areas of overlap. 
This is exacerbated by the role of exemplars. One effect of clinging on to past 
paradigms is to entrench the exemplars that those paradigms used. Yet if the 
context in which the law is applied has drastically changed, the result is that the 
exemplars are no longer serviceable as guides to the application of the law. One 
such shift, the disappearance of Hohfeldian powers from modern legal theory, and 
its deleterious consequences for the ability of the law to deal effectively with 
situations characterised by such powers, has already been noted above. But this is 
not the only issue. By giving a prominent place to exemplars from the past, 
revolution-oriented theories can also mischaracterise problems by failing to 
recognise that the problems the law is called upon to solve have changed, such that 
the models applied to solve those problems also need to change. Dan Priel provides 
an example of precisely such a mischaracterisation: 
Beever reads [Fontainebleau] as if it is concerned with the question whether one 
has a ‘right to sunbathe’. He does that despite the fact that this right is nowhere 
mentioned in the case, and is not at all the right that the land owner in the case is 
interested in. Limited liability companies being incorporeal entities have little 
interest in lying ‘exposed before the elements on loungers’. What the plaintiff in 
this case was interested in was to use nuisance law as a way of hampering a 
commercial competitor, and, unsurprisingly, the Court refused to play along. It is 
less than helpful to present it as a dispute over the existence of a ‘right to 
sunbathe’.83 
The result of a quest for legal revolutions, in other words, is to cause a growing 
divide between the worlds of legal theory and legal doctrine, and to entrench 
incommensurability within the world of legal theory, with little way of overcoming 
it. Further, to the extent the paradigms they entrench are grounded in exemplars far 
removed from the reality of the transactions that come before the courts, they are 
not only misleading, but false. Although doctrinal frameworks are neither true nor 
false, theoretical paradigms are necessarily true or false. Leaving aside purely 
normative paradigms which make no claims about any real legal system but focus 
instead on constructed ‘ideal’ legal systems, a scholarly paradigm purports to 
define and describe an aspect of the approach implicit in the legal system. Claims 
about the outcomes the legal system uses, the goals it pursues, the evaluative 
judgments it embeds, or some other characteristic claimed to be fundamental to the 
legal system, or somehow immanent in the legal system, are always implicit in 
theoretical paradigms. A paradigm which is grounded in exemplars that bear little 
resemblance to the reality of the law is false, because it makes claims about the 
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operation of the legal system which are not true.84 The combination of the 
propensity to entrench incommensurability in the world of legal theory, and the 
falsity of at least some of the paradigms giving rise to that incommensurability, are 
the reasons why legal revolutions are unproductive far more frequently than 
productive. 
 
V. Conclusion: The failure of legal revolutions 
There are no revolutions in the paradigms applied to black-letter law. There are 
evolutions, as the problem-solving techniques used by judges, and the frameworks 
of reductionism and evaluative significance on which they are based, incrementally 
adapt or fail to adapt in response to the changing social context in which they are 
applied. Legal scholarship can best make a contribution if it studies that process of 
adaptation — a task that necessarily requires it to attend to the social context of the 
law. Legal progress, seen in this light, is not progress in absolute terms, but in the 
relative terms of the better adaptation of law to the needs of a particular society at 
a particular point of time, given the broader institutional framework of the polity. 
This task requires an approach that is far closer to the formulation of usable 
heuristics than it is to the fundamental paradigm shifts that characterise revolutions. 
The constant quest to return to the paradigms of the past hinders the task of legal 
scholarship. It does not help it. 
From this perspective, private law scholarship would make a stronger contribution 
if it were to return to the traditional business of law: a focus on local issues, on 
specific problems, and on ways of resolving them without seeking coherence or 
conformity to a particular grand theory. SFC Milsom argued that many of the most 
influential developments in legal history were the product not of grand theorisation, 
but of practical persons attempting to solve practical problems.85 This chapter has 
sought to suggest some ways in which scholars of the common law might return to 
that task. Part of the answer lies in a closer focus on legal reductionism, on the 
things it leaves out in specific instances of working out problems it encounters, on 
the consequences of it leaving those things out, and on the role this leads it to play 
within the lives of the citizenry as well as the other governing institutions. 
The past of the law can be a tremendous resource in all of these tasks. It can 
contribute to a useful history of the present, which sheds light on the choices that 
have been made in the past, and the manner in which they have shaped the 
institutions of our modern society. A genealogical approach to the evolution and 
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spread of concepts, which Jenny Steele and I have argued for,86 is a powerful tool 
that can be deployed within this framework. All of these, however, require a shift 
in how we approach the past. They require us, in particular to cease to view the 
past as the telos of legal revolutions, or as a source of frameworks of a higher 
perfection which can and should be faithfully applied to present day problems. 
They require us, instead, to see it as a guide to how the law came to be what it is 
today, and, hence, to the evaluative positions and normative choices that lurk 
beneath the surface of the doctrinal framework; and to see in it also a means of 
illuminating the possibilities that were implicit in the past of the law, and in 
particular those which have not yet wholly faded away. 
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